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1 Introduction
Firms often engage in joint projects, i.e., projects that involve the contributions of two or more parties. In
the case of a joint project, rms are only partially responsible for the project and others may not be able
to precisely evaluate each partys contribution to the performance of the project. Consider, for example,
the dispute between Ford and Firestone, following the deadly accidents involving Ford Explorers equipped
with Firestone ATX tires in the summer of 2000. Was it merely a case of poor tires, as claimed by Ford,
or was the design of the Explorer partly responsible for the accidents, as Firestone asserted? The strong
controversy that surrounded this dispute and rmsattempts to pass the blame to their partner illustrate how
di¢ cult it is to assign responsibility for performance in joint projects. This di¢ culty makes the reputational
dynamics in the case of joint projects rather intricate. In this paper, we study the reputational implications
of situations where two rms implement a joint project, sharing the responsibility for its performance. In
particular, we address the following questions: How do rmsreputations evolve following the implementation
and performance of a joint project? How do the qualities and reputations of the potential partners a¤ect
the decision to participate in joint projects? How do reputation considerations a¤ect the choice between
individual and joint implementation of projects, when both alternatives are feasible?
Although most of the insights generated in this article apply to many di¤erent settings where reputation
is important, for concreteness we focus on the situation where rms produce experience goods, i.e., goods
whose performance consumers can only infer after their purchasing decision. Formally, we consider an adverse
selection model where rms face the opportunity to implement a joint project through a partnership. We
dene a partnership broadly as any situation where two or more parties contribute to the performance of
a given project. Thus, our denition of partnership encompasses not only joint-ventures, but also vertical
relationships where, for example, a rm outsources the production of an important component of a product
to another rm as in the case of Ford and Firestone. In our model, rms qualities are observable only
by rms. Consumers hold beliefs about rmsqualities. These beliefs are updated upon observing rms
decision to form a partnership and the performance of the jointly implemented project. We model a rms
reputation as the expected value of its quality, according to consumersbeliefs. Firmsreputations are crucial
because consumers base their purchasing decisions on them. In contrast, rmstrue qualities are important
because they a¤ect the performance of the projects in which rms participate and, thereby, rms future
reputations. We assume that consumers observe the identity of the rm or rms that implement a project.
In our context, this means that rms can associate their reputations (and qualities) to a project if and only
if they participate in the project.1
1An implication of this assumption is that the reputation and quality (or other fundamental characteristics) of a rm are
nonseparable. In the last section of the paper, we discuss the implications of the nonseparability of a rms reputation and
quality, relating it to the concepts of (non)transferability and (non)tradeability of reputations (see e.g., Tadelis, 1999, 2002).
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We identify an important di¤erence between projects that are implemented jointly and projects that are
implemented by a single rm. Unlike the case of projects implemented by a single rm, in the case of joint
projects a rms reputation may worsen following a success; conversely, a rms reputation may improve
following a failure. The intuition for these results is the following. Consider a partnership where one of the
rms contributes more to the implementation of the joint project than its partner. When updating their
beliefs about rmsqualities, consumers will tend to attribute the responsibility for a success or a failure of
the joint project mainly to that rm. If partnersqualities are perceived by consumers as being negatively
correlated, a success of the joint project may then harm the reputation of the other rm and a failure
may enhance it. In our model this negative correlation is endogenously generated by the rmsequilibrium
implementation strategy of the joint project.
Most of the analysis in the article focuses on projects that cannot be implemented by a single rm.
This corresponds to situations where rms have complementary assets or capabilities. In such cases, rms
choice is between implementing the project through a partnership, or simply not pursuing the project. The
dynamics of rmsreputations associated with joint implementation crucially depends on rmsequilibrium
implementation decisions, as these decisions may signal information about rmsqualities to the market. We
focus on equilibria in which rms form a partnership and develop the joint project if and only if their qualities
are high.2 In these equilibria, a success of the joint project may a¤ect negatively the reputation of one of the
rms. However, the overall impact of a success of the joint project on rmsreputations and future prots
is positive. Thus, if we dene the best partner as the one for which the increase in total prots associated
with a partnership is the largest, a high quality partner is preferable to a low quality partner. Regarding the
desired reputation of a partner, we identify a basic trade-o¤. While a high reputation partner enhances the
reputation of the joint project, such a partner tends to absorb most of the credit associated with a success
and to be disregarded as responsible for a failure. As a result, the impact on a rms reputation of having a
high reputation partner may be negative. If the rms future projects are su¢ ciently important relative to
the joint project, this negative reputational e¤ect may lead to lower total prots. This implies that a high
reputation partner is not necessarily preferable to a low reputation partner.
In the last part of the article, we relax the assumption that individual implementation of the project is
not possible. This allows us to discuss the reputational trade-o¤s involved in the choice between individual
and joint implementation. In such cases, a rm that owns a project faces several implementation options.
First, it may stretch its reputation to the new project, implementing it alone. Second, it may combine
its reputation with that of another rm, implementing the project through a partnership. Third, it may
2As we shall see, equilibria in which rms develop the joint project if and only if their qualities are low exist in some cases.
This type of equilibrium does not survive when sabotage of the joint project is possible, i.e., when rms may make the joint
project fail on purpose. In this paper, we focus on sabotage-free equilibria.
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fully associate the reputation (and quality) of another rm to the project, by letting that rm implement
the project alone. This may be accomplished by selling the project to that rm.3 We nd that when a
rm is particularly concerned about its future reputation, the optimal implementation strategy is largely
determined by the relative position of its quality and initial reputation. Specically, if the rms quality is
substantially lower than its initial reputation, the rm tends to protect its reputation by selling the project
to another rm. On the other hand, if the rms quality is substantially higher than its initial reputation,
the rm tends to implement the project alone in order to prove its quality. Finally, if the rms quality and
initial reputation are close, the rm is more prone to form a partnership. In such cases, the rm is neither
very reluctant to participate in new projects, nor very eager to implement them alone.
There is an important di¤erence between the case where only joint implementation is possible and the case
where individual implementation is also possible. In the former case, rmsqualities are always substitutes,
meaning that the higher the quality of a given rm the lower the required quality of a partner for a partnership
to be formed. In the latter case, rmsqualities may either be substitutes or complements, where complements
means that the higher the quality of a given rm the higher the required quality of a partner for a partnership
to be formed. This di¤erence stems from the fact that, when individual implementation is possible, the higher
the quality of a rm the more attractive individual implementation by that rm becomes. The fact that
rmsqualities may be complements implies that rmsincentive to form a partnership may decrease when
the quality of one of the rms increases. Thus, a high quality partner is not necessarily preferable to a low
quality partner. This result contrasts with that obtained for the case where individual implementation is
not possible.
Related Literature. There are two approaches in the literature to the modeling of reputations. Fol-
lowing the seminal article of Klein and Le­ er (1981), several authors have developed moral hazard models
of reputation, i.e., models where rmsactions are not observable, and analyze the conditions under which
rms have the incentive to exert costly e¤ort to develop or protect a valuable reputation (e.g., Shapiro,
1983; Tirole, 1996; Holmström, 1999; Hörner, 2002). A complementary research stream, which builds on
the important articles of Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982), uses adverse selection
models of reputation, i.e., models where there is incomplete information about rms characteristics and
reputation corresponds to othersbeliefs about those characteristics (e.g., Wernerfelt, 1988; Tadelis, 1999;
Cabral, 2000). Ours in an adverse selection model of reputation.
The existing literature on reputation largely focuses on projects developed by a single entity, overlooking
the reputational implications of shared responsibility. There are, however, some exceptions. Jeon (1996)
analyzes parties incentives to exert e¤ort in situations of joint production when they are concerned with
3Since a rms reputation and quality are nonseparable, the only way to fully associate another rms reputation to the
project is by letting that rm implement the project alone.
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their individual reputations, and compares how di¤erent organizational forms perform in solving the parties
moral hazard problem. Bar-Isaac (2007) shows that the concern of a seniormember about the reputa-
tion of a professional partnership (or, more specically, about the reputation of a juniormember) may
induce him/her to exert e¤ort when only the output of the partnership is observed.4 Anderson and Smith
(2006) study matching decisions when partiesreputations are important, and show that positive assortative
matching (in reputations) is generally not an equilibrium. An important di¤erence between our paper and
Anderson and Smith (2006), as well as between our paper and Jeon (1996) and Bar-Isaac (2007), is that
we consider a setting where rms have better information about their qualities than the market. Thus, the
contribution of our paper to this literature is to study the dynamics of rmsreputations when not only the
performance of the joint project, but also rmsdecision to implement it reveals information about rms
qualities to the market. In this setting, rms implementation decisions of joint projects depend on the
reputational implications (of both the implementation and the performance) of those projects, and, in turn,
these reputational implications depend on rmsimplementation decisions.5
Our paper is related to the articles by Wernerfelt (1988), Cabral (2000) and Miklós-Thal (2008) on brand
stretching and to the article by Tadelis (1999) on reputation as a tradeable asset. Wernerfelt (1988), Cabral
(2000) and Miklós-Thal (2008) study a rms choice between stretching its reputation to a new project
through brand stretching and marketing the new project under a new brand. Tadelis (1999) focuses on
situations where reputations are embedded in names and, as a result, the market for names corresponds
to a market for reputations, and analyzes the incentives to buy a name and associate it with a project.
These papers assume that reputation and quality are separable. We focus on situations where reputation
and quality are nonseparable and study the intermediate case where a rm partially associates an existing
reputation to a new project by implementing it through a partnership. Furthermore, we analyze a rms
choice between stretching its reputation, combining its reputation with that of another rm, and fully
associating the reputation (and quality) of another rm to the project.
Our paper is also related to the literature on multidimensional signalling (and multidimensional screening)
4Morrison and Wilhelm (2004) also study the incentives of partners to mentor juniors in order to protect the reputation
of a professional partnership. The authors focus on the aggregate reputation of the partnership, not on the reputation of its
members. In their model, there is no role for individual reputations. This precludes them from analyzing the impact of joint
projects on individual reputations, which is our concern here. Tirole (1996) does study the joint dynamics of individual and
collective reputations when modeling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations. However, Tirole
focuses on how individual membersincentives (and actions) a¤ect individual and collective reputations, not on how collective
actions (for which individual members are jointly responsible) a¤ect those reputations.
5 In formalizing a theory of scapegoats, Segendor¤ (2000) shows that a leader may choose an incompetent co-worker so that
he can later protect his reputation in case things go wrong by blaming the co-worker. Segendor¤ also considers that both the
leader and the co-worker have private information about their abilities. However, in contrast with our paper, Segendor¤ (2000)
focuses on the case where the leader can prove to others that the co-worker is incompetent after a negative joint outcome has
been observed.
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(e.g., Quinzii and Rochet, 1985; Wilson, 1985; Engers, 1987; Rochet and Chone, 1998). We assume that side
payments between rms are possible and, as a result, rms maximize their joint prot. Hence, conceptually
our problem is similar to that of a monopolist with private information about several characteristics which
are unknown to consumers. The main concern in the literature on multidimensional signalling has been the
existence and characterization of (fully) separating equilibria. In our model, such equilibria cannot exist
because the characteristics about which rms have private information (rmsqualities) are continuous and
rmssignal space has two elements - to form a partnership or not to do so.
Plan of the Paper. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model. In Section 3,
we analyze the impact of the performance of joint projects on partnersreputations. In Section 4, we analyze
rmsincentives to form partnerships and characterize all the reputational implications of those decisions.
In this section, we focus on projects that cannot be implemented individually. In Section 5, we analyze the
case of projects that can be implemented jointly or individually, and study the main reputational trade-o¤s
involved in the choice between joint and individual implementation. In Section 6, we present concluding
remarks.
2 Basic Model
Consider an economy with a continuum of rms with measure one and two periods, period one and period
two. At the beginning of period one a countable (i.e., measure zero) subset of the set of possible pairs of
rms are endowed with a joint project, which they may decide to implement or not. Joint projects can only
be implemented in period one and last one period if implemented. To capture the dynamic reputational
e¤ects of implementing a joint project, we consider that each rm in the economy is endowed with a basic
product that it sells individually in period two.6 Let rm A and rm B be a pair of rms that is endowed
with a joint project. The implementation of the joint project requires the participation of both rms.7
The required contribution of rm A to the partnership is A 2 (0; 1), which implies the complementary
contribution B = 1 A of rm B. Firmsdecision is whether or not to form a partnership and implement
the joint project in period one. We assume that side payments between rms are possible. This implies that
the division of surplus between rms is immaterial to the decision to form a partnership and implement the
joint project. Firms take the decision that maximizes their joint prot.
For concreteness, suppose that the joint project consists of producing and selling a new product. To
push reputation to the fore, assume that both this product and rmsbasic products are experience goods.
Thus, consumers base their purchasing decisions on their expectations of the performance of the products.
6We could assume that rms also sell their basic products in period one. However, this would unnecessarily complicate the
analysis of the basic model without bringing any additional insight.
7This assumption is relaxed in Section 5, where we assume that either of the two rms may implement this project alone.
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We assume that each of the products either performs well or not. Consumers value the new (joint) product
V if it performs well, and 0 if otherwise. Similarly, consumers value rm is basic product Vi if it performs
well, and 0 if otherwise, for all i 2 fA,Bg. Throughout, we say that the joint project is a success if the joint
product performs well and a failure if it does not.8
Technology. Firms are endowed with qualities that a¤ect the performance of their products. More
specically, rm is quality, qi 2 [0; 1], represents the probability that its products perform well. We assume
that the quality of the joint product, i.e., the probability that the joint product performs well, is a weighted
average of the rmsqualities, where the weights are the rmsparticipation levels in the joint project. Thus,
the quality of the joint product given rmsqualities q  (qA; qB), which we denote by qJ(q), is given by
qJ(q) = AqA + BqB .9 (2.1)
Information. The following is common knowledge. Firms know their qualities. Specically, each rm
knows its own quality and the quality of the potential partner. Consumers do not know rmsqualities.
They hold beliefs about these qualities. Consumers initial beliefs about rm is quality, i.e., consumers
beliefs about qi at the beginning of period one, are described by the (correct) prior Gi(qi) (with density
gi(qi)), for all i 2 fA,Bg. Consumers may have di¤erent priors about rms A and B, as the two rms may
di¤er in dimensions (not explicitly modelled here) that are observable by consumers.10 We assume that
these priors are atomless distributions, that gi(qi) > 0 for all qi 2 [0; 1] and i 2 fA,Bg, and that consumers
initially perceive rmsqualities as independent. The prior joint distribution of rmsqualities is denoted
by G(q) (with density g(q)).
Consumers do not observe whether rms are endowed with a joint project at the beginning of period
one. However, they do observe rmsdecision to form a partnership and implement a joint project. Thus,
consumers only learn about the existence of a joint project in case it is implemented. At the end of period
one, consumers observe the performance of the joint project in case rms implemented it. We denote the
performance of the joint product by ' 2 ff; sg, where ' = s if the joint project is a success, and ' = f if
it is a failure. Joint product performance is public information. Although consumers know the identity of
each partner and its required contribution to the partnership, they do not observe which rm is responsible
for a success or a failure of the joint project.
8 In this model, a rms production of a given product can be interpreted either as the situation where the rm produces one
unit of the product or many units that perform equally.
9Alternatively, we could assume a more general function qJ (q). As long as this function is increasing in qA and qB , the
characterization of the equilibria would not change. It should be noted, however, that to ensure the existence of some of the
equilibria analyzed in the paper, continuity of qJ (q) in q is required.
10Suppose, for example, that rms in the economy are distributed in a two-dimensional space (q; ), where  is observable
by consumers. Then, Gi(qi) corresponds to consumers (correct) prior about rm is quality given i, for i 2 fA;Bg. The
observable parameter  may correspond, for instance, to the size of the rm, to the industry where it operates, or to whether
it is listed in the stock exchange or not.
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Consumers update their beliefs about rmsqualities both after observing the implementation of the
joint project and after observing its performance. Since consumers do not observe whether rms have a
joint project available and the set of rms that have one is of measure zero, consumersposterior beliefs
are equal to their prior beliefs if rms do not implement the joint project. This is consistent with the fact
that, in practice, consumers typically do not revise their perception about a rms quality if they observe
that no (unexpected) partnership has been formed.11 We denote consumersbeliefs after they observe the
formation of a partnership and the implementation of the joint project by H1(q) (with density h1(q)) and call
them interim beliefs. Similarly, we denote consumersbeliefs following the observation of the performance
of the joint project by H2(q j' ) (with density h2(q j' )) and call them ex-post beliefs. Consumers observe
the performance of the joint project at the end of period one, before they purchase rmsbasic products in
period two.12
Reputation. We dene a rms reputation as the expected value, from the consumersperspective, of
the rms quality given the information that consumers possess. In our context, a rms reputation can be
interpreted as the expected probability that the rms products perform well.
There are three types of reputations that are relevant for decision making. First, the initial reputations,
which correspond to rmsreputations at the beginning of period one. The initial reputation of rm i 2
fA;Bg, denoted by ri, is the expected value of its quality according to consumersinitial beliefs G(q). Second,
the interim reputations, which correspond to rmsreputations after consumers observe rmsdecision to
form a partnership and implement the joint project. The interim reputation of rm i 2 fA;Bg, denoted
by r0i, is the expected value of its quality according to consumersinterim beliefs H1(q). Third, the ex-post
reputations, which correspond to rmsreputations at the beginning of period two, after consumers observe
the formation of a partnership and the performance of the joint project. The ex-post reputation of rm
i 2 fA;Bg, denoted by r00i ('), is the expected value of its quality according to consumersex-post beliefs
H2(q j' ).
Expected Prots. For simplicity, we assume that rmsproduction costs of the joint product and of
their period two products are zero. Furthermore, we assume that the market is short on the sellersside and
that consumers bid competitively for all the products. Thus, rmsprots associated with a given product
11Consider, for example, the recent partnership between Harley Davidson and Porsche to produce the V-Rod motorcycle.
Suppose that, after considering the implementation of the project, the two companies had instead decided not to pursue it.
If consumers were unaware that Harley Davidson and Porsche were considering such a project, it is unlikely that they would
update their beliefs about rmsqualities following rmsdecision not to implement it.
12The results in the paper hold if the measure of rms that have a joint project available to be implemented in period one
is positive but small. This is because the interim and ex-post beliefs are continuous in the probability that rms have a joint
project available when that probability is zero. The results about existence and characterization of equilibria in Propositions 1
to 3 of Section 4 remain valid even if the measure of rms that have a joint project available is higher.
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correspond to the consumerswillingness to pay for that product.13
Consumerswillingness to pay for a product is given by their expected benet from consumption. Hence,
consumersvaluation of the joint product when rms implement it is the expected value of (AeqA+BeqB)V






In a similar way, consumers valuation of the basic product of rm i 2 fA,Bg sold in period two is the
expected value of eqiVi according to ex-post beliefs if rms implement the joint project and to initial beliefs
if rms do not implement the joint project. Thus, in case of implementation and performance ' of the joint
project, this valuation is
r00i (')Vi. (2.3)
In case of no implementation of the joint project this valuation is riVi.
When considering the decision to form a partnership, rms compare their expected joint prot with and
without implementation of the joint project. Since, in general, these prots depend on rmsqualities, we
denote them by P (q) and 0(q), respectively. From (2.2) and (2.3) it follows that







r00i (f)Vi + qJ(q)
X
i=A;B
[r00i (s)  r00i (f)]Vi. (2.4)
The rst term in (2.4) corresponds to the direct prots from implementing the joint project. The second
and third terms in (2.4) correspond to rmsexpected prots associated with selling their basic products
in period two. Firmsperiod two prots depend on their ex-post reputations, which are the reputations
associated with a success of the joint project with probability qJ(q) and the reputations associated with a
failure with the complementary probability. Note that the qualities of rms A and B do not a¤ect the prot
associated with the joint project; they a¤ect prots only by a¤ecting the performance of the joint project
and, thereby, rmsfuture reputations.
By deciding not to implement the joint project, rms forego the potential prot associated with it, but
insulate their reputations from the performance of the joint project.15 Firmsjoint prot associated with
not implementing the joint project is given by
0 (q) = rAVA + rBVB . (2.5)
Equilibrium. We characterize rmsequilibrium decision of whether to form a partnership and imple-
ment the joint project for xed initial beliefs. We denote rms strategy by (q), which represents the
13As, for example, in Tadelis (1999) and Cabral (2000), this assumption allows us to ignore signalling through prices. This
allows us to focus on the decision to form a partnership.
14Throughout the paper we use tilde signs to denote random variables.
15This closely parallels Cabral (2000), where the reputation of an existing brand remains unchanged if the rm decides not
to stretch the brand to a new project.
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probability that they form a partnership given their qualities. We assume that rms form a partnership if
and only if P (q) > 0 (q). Thus, as a tie-breaking rule we assume that rms do not form a partnership if
P (q) = 0 (q). We use Bayesian Equilibrium as the equilibrium concept. In equilibrium, rmsdecision
of whether to form a partnership and implement the joint project maximizes their joint prot given their
future reputations, and rmsfuture reputations are Bayesian consistent with rmsstrategy regarding the
decision to form a partnership and implement the joint project.
3 Joint Project Performance and Reputation
In this section, we characterize the impact of the performance of the joint project on rms reputations,
taking rmsdecision to implement it and consumersinterim beliefs as given. This is only a rst step in our
analysis. In Section 4, we then consider all the reputational implications of implementing the joint project
by endogenizing rmsimplementation decision and, therefore, consumersinterim beliefs.
Suppose that at the beginning of period one rms A and B formed a partnership and implemented the
joint project. Following the observation of the performance of the project at the end of the period, consumers
update their beliefs about rmsqualities. They do so by applying Bayesrule to interim beliefs H1(q). Thus,
consumersex-post beliefs satisfy
h2(q j' ) =
Pr[' j q]h1(q)Z
Pr[' j bq]dH1(bq) (3.1)
for all ' 2 ff; sg, where Pr[' = s j q] = qJ(q) and Pr[' = f j q] = 1  qJ(q) represent, respectively, the prob-
ability that the joint project succeeds and the probability that it fails. Using (3.1) one can characterize the
impact of the performance of the joint project on rmsreputations. Lemma 1 o¤ers a useful characterization
of rmsex-post reputations, relating them to the interim reputations.
Lemma 1 The ex-post reputations of rm i 2 fA;Bg in case of a success (' = s) and of a failure (' = f)
of the joint project are such that
r00i (s)  r0i =
ivar(eqi) + (1  i)cov(eqA; eqB)
r0J
; (3.2)
r00i (f)  r0i =  




r00i (s)  r00i (f) =
ivar(eqi) + (1  i)cov(eqA; eqB)
r0J(1  r0J)
, (3.4)




B, and var(eqi) and cov(eqA; eqB) are, respectively, the variance of eqi and the covariance
between eqA and eqB according to interim beliefs H1(q).
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Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Lemma 1 characterizes the updating that takes place on rmsreputations when consumers observe the
performance of a joint project. In particular, it emphasizes that the change in a rms reputation depends
on consumersperceived variance of its quality, as well as on consumersperceived correlation between its
quality and the quality of the partner (captured in (3.2)-(3.4) by the covariance term). Note that even
if consumers initially perceive rmsqualities as not correlated, this is not necessarily the case after they
observe that a partnership has been formed.
When consumersinterim beliefs are such that the correlation between rmsperceived qualities is non-
negative, (3.2) and (3.3) reveal that rmsreputations necessarily increase with a success of a joint project
and decrease with a failure.16 Observe, however, that if consumers interim beliefs are such that rms
qualities are negatively correlated, the numerator in (3.2)-(3.4) may eventually be negative. This raises the
possibility that a rms reputation decreases with a success of a joint project and increases with a failure.
One important question is whether such an updating may occur in equilibrium when rmsdecisions to form
partnerships are taken into account. We next analyze this issue among others.
4 Partnership Formation and Reputation Dynamics
In this section, we analyze rms decision to form a partnership and the evolution of rms reputations
following this decision. We take into account both the signalling e¤ect of the decision to form a partnership
and the e¤ect of the performance of the joint project on rmsreputations.
In equilibrium, consumersbeliefs about rmsqualities must be consistent with rms strategy (q).
Thus, in equilibrium, consumersinterim beliefs result from applying Bayes rule to initial beliefs G(q). That




Clearly, these beliefs may di¤er from consumersinitial beliefs. Intuitively, this is because rmsdecision to
form a partnership may signal information about their qualities to consumers. By a¤ecting interim beliefs,
16This is the case, for example, when consumersinterim beliefs H1(q) are such that rmsqualities are independent. In this
case, cov(eqA; eqB) in Lemma 1 is 0, which implies that r00i (s) > r0i, r00i (f) < r0i and, consequently, r00i (s) > r00i (f) for all i 2 fA;Bg.
Note that the case where consumers interim beliefs H1(q) are such that rms qualities are independent comprises the case
where consumers are uncertain about the quality of only one rm. Thus, if consumers are uncertain about the quality of only
one rm, a success (resp. failure) of the joint project always has a positive (resp. negative) impact on the reputation of that
rm. This is what happens when a rm implements a project alone. This is also what happens, for example, in Bar-Isaac
(2007). In Bar-Isaac (2007) only the ability of the junior member in the partnership is uncertain. Thus, the junior members
reputation always increases following a good performance of the partnership.
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this signalling e¤ect also a¤ects ex-post beliefs. Indeed, from (4.1) and (3.1) it follows that consumers
ex-post beliefs must satisfy
h2(q j' ) =
Pr[' j q](q)g(q)Z
Pr[' j bq](bq)dG(bq) : (4.2)
From (4.1) and (4.2) it is immediate that rmsinterim and ex-post reputations critically depend on rms
equilibrium strategy (q). Thus, one cannot study the reputational implications of joint projects without
analyzing rmsequilibrium decisions regarding the implementation of such projects.
Equipped with the above characterization of consumersinterim and ex-post beliefs, we now investigate
how rms qualities a¤ect their decision to form a partnership and implement the joint project. When
deciding whether to form a partnership and implement the joint project, rms consider two main e¤ects.
While the implementation of the joint project allows rms to capture the prots associated with this project,
it also a¤ects rms future reputations and thereby their future prots. The rst e¤ect is always non-negative.
The second e¤ect may be negative or positive.
As it is typically the case in signalling games, there always exists a pooling equilibrium in which rms
A and B abstain from implementing the joint project regardless of their qualities, i.e., in which (q) = 0
for all q 2 [0; 1]2. This equilibrium exists because the notion of Bayesian equilibrium does not impose any
restriction on beliefs associated with zero-probability events. In our case, if we make consumers beliefs
su¢ ciently unfavorable to rms in the event they implement the joint project, we can support a pooling
equilibrium in which rms never implement it. In this equilibrium, rmsreputations remain unchanged but
would be very low in the event they decided to implement the joint project. A well-known problem of this
type of equilibrium is that it crucially relies on the arbitrary assumption of su¢ ciently unfavorablebeliefs
o¤-the-equilibrium path. Because of this arbitrariness and the fact that in our model consumersbeliefs
determine rmsreputations, which are the major driver of rmsdecisions, we ignore this equilibrium in
the remainder of the paper. In fact, this equilibrium is not a universally divine equilibrium.17
We now focus on equilibria with implementation of the joint project, i.e., equilibria in which at least
some (types of) rms A and B form a partnership and implement the joint project. If the value of the joint
project V is su¢ ciently high relative to the values of rmsfuture projects VA and VB (and of course rms
17To be more precise, this equilibrium does not survive the Universal Divinity criterion (criterion D2) in a discretized version
of the model where there is a nite (although possibly arbitrarily large) number of rmstypes  i.e., rmsqualities which
includes types 0 and 1. In each iteration, criterion D2 eliminates a quality vector (qA; qB) di¤erent from (0,0) and (1,1).
Intermediate vectors are eliminated, rather than those with the lowest combined quality AqA + BqB because, as we shall
see below, in general rmspayo¤s from implementing the joint project may increase or decrease with qualities depending on
consumersbeliefs. When only quality vectors (0,0) and (1,1) remain, rmspayo¤ necessarily increase with a success of the
joint project. Thus, quality vector (0,0) is eliminated and only vector (1,1) remains. This eliminates any equilibrium where no
pair of rms form a partnership to implement the joint project. All the other equilibria presented in the paper are universally
divine equilibria.
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interim reputations are bounded away from 0), rms will have the incentive to form a partnership regardless
of their qualities. This is because rmsdirect prot associated with the joint project will always o¤set rms
eventual losses in future projects due to reputational implications of the joint project. To make this claim
more precise, let V  denote the value of V that satises the following condition,




(1  ArA   BrB)
Vi, (4.3)
where var(eqi) corresponds to the variance of eqi according to consumersinitial beliefs G(q). Then, we can
state the following.
Proposition 1 A pooling equilibrium in which rms form a partnership and implement the joint project
independently of their qualities exists if and only if V > V .
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
In this equilibrium, rmsdecision to form a partnership and implement the joint project is uninformative
about rmsqualities. Since no signalling e¤ect exists, consumers update their beliefs about rmsqualities
only after observing whether the joint project was a success or a failure. Furthermore, since consumers
interim beliefs and initial beliefs are identical and consumersinitial beliefs are that qualities are uncorrelated,
in this equilibrium a success (resp. failure) of the joint project always increases (resp. decreases) both rms
reputations. Condition V > V  ensures that the joint project is implemented when both rms have the
lowest possible quality, i.e., when qi = 0 for all i 2 fA;Bg. The left-hand side of condition (4.3) corresponds
to rmsprot associated with the joint project. The right-hand side represents rmsfuture losses (in their
basic products) triggered by the ex-post reputation implications of the performance of the joint project, when
both rms have the lowest possible quality. Since the probability of success of the joint project increases
with rmsqualities and, in this equilibrium, a success of the joint project increases rmsreputations, when
V > V  all rms are better o¤ implementing the joint project.
We devote the remainder of this section to the analysis of joint projects with value V  V . For V  V ,
rmsdirect prot associated with the joint project is no longer su¢ cient to always compensate rmseventual
losses in future projects due to reputational implications of the joint project. Consequently, no equilibrium
where rms form a partnership and implement the joint project regardless of their qualities exists. In such
cases, the only equilibria with implementation of the joint project are semiseparating equilibria, i.e., equilibria
where some but not all (types of) rms A and B form a partnership. As we will see below, these equilibria
emerge because rms with a di¤erent combined quality AqA+BqB may have a di¤erent incentive to form
a partnership.
Proposition 2 For V  V , (i) a semiseparating equilibrium where rms implement the joint project i¤
their combined quality is above a threshold quality level (higher quality partners equilibrium) always exists,
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and (ii) under some conditions, a semiseparating equilibrium where rms implement the joint project i¤ their
combined quality is below a threshold quality level (lower quality partners equilibrium) exists.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Proposition 2 identies two types of equilibria: higher quality partners equilibria and lower quality
partners equilibria. Higher quality partners equilibria correspond to situations where the impact of the
performance of the joint project on rmsreputations is such that a success leads to a higher future joint
prot than does a failure. In this case, rms implement the project whenever they can guarantee a success
with a su¢ ciently high probability. Since the probability of success increases with rmsqualities, for a given
quality of one of the rms, rms implement the joint product when the quality of the other rm is su¢ ciently
high. Technically, this equilibrium emerges because rmsexpected joint prot from implementing the joint
project satises the single-crossing property with respect to qualities. In our context, this means that
rmsincremental gain from implementing the joint project increases with rmsqualities. An immediate
implication is that low quality rms do not have the incentive to imitate high quality rms and implement
the joint project.
Bayesian updating by consumers implies only that the reputation of one of the rms in the partnership
increases with a success of the joint project and decreases with a failure. In fact, it may happen that
the reputation of the other rm decreases with a success of the joint project and increases with a failure.
The idea that a rms reputation may decrease following a success of a project in which it participates
and increase following a failure may seem somewhat counter-intuitive. One typically expects that being
associated with a successful event is better in terms of reputation than being associated with an event that
is perceived as a failure. To understand these results let us go back to our model. For concreteness, consider
the case of rm A and assume that its participation level in the partnership is low. In case of a success
of the joint project, consumers infer that rm B (the one whose contribution to the project is high) has a
high quality. Moreover, following implementation of the joint project, consumers perceive rmsqualities as
negatively correlated, as implementation occurs more often when rmsqualities are signicantly di¤erent
(i.e., one is high and the other low) than when they are similar. This negative correlation is endogenously
generated by the implementation strategy itself, since by assumption rmsqualities are initially perceived
as independent.18 If this negative correlation is su¢ ciently high (in absolute value), consumers infer that
rm A has a low quality. In case of a failure of the joint project, a similar reasoning would lead to the
opposite conclusion.19
18 In Miklós-Thal (2008) in equilibrium brand stretching introduces endogenous positive correlation between the quality of
the new product and the quality of the initial product, even if qualities were initially perceived as independent. In contrast, in
our model the endogenous quality correlation generated in equilibrium by the decision to form a partnership is negative.
19The reputational consequences for Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) of the release in 2002 of the movie John Q
illustrate that, in fact, when there is shared responsibility the reputational dynamics may be rather intricate. The release of the
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In a higher quality partners equilibrium, a success of the joint project may have a negative e¤ect on
the reputation of one of the rms. However, if this negative e¤ect is present it is always dominated by
the positive e¤ect of a success on the other rms reputation. Hence, a higher combined quality implies a
higher expected joint prot. We next present an example of a higher quality partners equilibrium where
the reputation of one of the rms (rm A) decreases following a success of the joint project and increases
following a failure. Because of its extreme simplicity, we provide here an example with two-type rms.
Example 1 Suppose that qi 2 f0; 1g and that consumers initially believe that qi = 1 with probability pi,
for all i 2 fA;Bg. In this two-type case, a rms reputation is the consumersperceived probability that the
rm is of quality 1. Thus, pi is the initial reputation of rm i. Consider now an implementation strategy
where rms implement the joint project i¤ q 2 f(1; 0); (0; 1); (1; 1)g, i.e., they abstain from implementing the
joint project only if both have quality 0. Given this strategy, Bayesian updating implies that rm is interim
reputation satises r0i = pi=(pA + pB   pApB), for all i 2 fA;Bg. In a similar way, Bayesian updating
implies that rm is ex-post reputations satisfy
r00i (f) =
jpi(1  pj)
BpA(1  pB) + A(1  pA)pB
and r00i (s) =
ipi(1  pj) + pApB
ApA(1  pB) + B(1  pA)pB + pApB
, (4.4)
where j 2 fA;Bg with j 6= i, for all i 2 fA;Bg.
Let pA = pB = 1=2. From (4.4), it follows that r00i (s) < r
00
i (f) if and only if i < 1=3. Suppose, for
concreteness, that A = 1=4. In this case, rmsinterim reputations are identical, r0i = 2=3 for i 2 fA;Bg,
rm As ex-post reputations are r00A(f) = 3=4 > 5=8 = r
00
A(s), and rm Bs ex-post reputations are r
00
B(f) = 1=4
< 7=8 = r00B(s). Given these interim and ex-post reputations and the fact that rms reputations remain
unchanged if they do not implement the joint project, it can easily be veried that when, for example, V = 1,
VA = 2 and VB = 5, rms are (strictly) better o¤ implementing the joint project precisely if and only if
q 2 f(1; 0); (0; 1); (1; 1)g.
Lower quality partners equilibria correspond to situations where a success of the joint project has a
negative impact on rmsjoint prot. This is the case because the negative e¤ect of a success of the joint
project on the reputation of one of the rms exists and dominates the positive e¤ect of a success on the other
rms reputation. Since rms have a higher joint prot when the joint project fails than when it succeeds,
movie seemed to entail signicant reputational risks for HMOs. The movie depicted a desperate man wielding a gun who took
over a hospital when his health plan did not cover his sons heart transplant operation. Instead of criticizing lmmakers for the
inaccuracies and unfairness of the movie, the American Association of Health Plans reacted by emphasizing the governments
responsibility for not helping uninsured and underinsured customers in an advertisement stating John Q. Its not just a
movie. Its a crisis for 40 million people who cant a¤ord health care. As a result, the responsibility for the crisis was
largely attributed to the government and HMOsreputation apparently did not su¤er. As Mark Goodin, a consultant to the
Association put it: ...we got a lot of media coverage, and more important, we didnt come across as inhumane by trying to
defend the indefensible (Alsop, 2004, p. 26).
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rms with high qualities are more reluctant to implement the joint project than rms with low qualities. As
in higher quality partners equilibria, here rmsexpected joint prot from implementing the joint project
satises the single-crossing property with respect to qualities. In this case, however, rmsincremental gain
from implementing the joint project decreases with rmsqualities. Lower quality partners equilibria may
provide an explanation for the fact that rms may implement joint projects of moderate value even when
their qualities are low and there is a good chance that the project fails.20
We identied all possible types of equilibria. In our setting, there are only two possible types of semi-
separating equilibria, higher quality partners equilibria and lower quality partners equilibria, depending on
whether a success of the joint project has a positive or negative impact on rmsfuture prots. It follows
from Propositions 1 and 2 that a higher quality partners equilibrium always exists when an equilibrium in
which rms implement the joint project regardless of their qualities does not. Proposition 2 also states that
there are situations where a lower quality partners equilibrium exists. Note, however, that a lower quality
partners equilibrium in which the reputation of rm i 2 fA;Bg decreases following a success of the joint
project can exist only if i < Vi=(VA+VB). Furthermore, a lower quality partners equilibrium can exist only
if the value of the joint project V is strictly positive. Indeed, when V is zero only higher quality partners
equilibria exist among those equilibria with implementation of the joint project.21
In a lower quality partners equilibrium, rms are better o¤ if the joint project fails than if it succeeds.
Since partners typically have the possibility to inuence the performance of a joint project, the fact that
rms are better o¤ if the joint project fails than if it succeeds suggests the possibility of sabotage, i.e., the
possibility that partners may make the joint project fail on purpose.22 When sabotage is possible, lower
quality partners equilibria do not exist. To see why this is the case consider the following. Suppose that
a lower quality partners equilibrium exists and sabotage is possible. In such an equilibrium, all rms that
implement the joint project will sabotage it. Thus, a failure of the joint project is no longer informative
about rmsqualities and rmsjoint prot under implementation of the joint project is independent of their
qualities. It follows that either all pairs of rms or no pair of rms implement the joint project. This leads
to a contradiction, since by denition in a lower quality partners equilibrium no full pooling exists.
In the remainder of this section, we focus on higher quality partners equilibria. When V < V , higher
quality partners equilibria are the only equilibria with implementation of the joint project that are sabotage-
free; they are also the only universally divine equilibria that are sabotage-free.23
20 In the equilibrium identied in Proposition 1, low quality rms also implement the joint project. However, such an
equilibrium exists only if the value of the joint project is high enough to o¤set the negative reputational e¤ect associated with
its failure.
21For a formal proof of these results see Appendix A.2.
22Although sabotage is unlikely to occur in some situations because of ethical or legal reasons (e.g., medical doctors performing
a surgery together), in most cases it is certainly a real possibility.
23 In general, we cannot rule out the possibility that there exists more than one higher quality partners equilibrium. However,
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In a higher quality partners equilibrium, rmsqualities are substitutes, in the sense that the marginal
rate at which rmsqualities can be exchanged so that their incentives to form a partnership remain constant
is negative. This is because rms want to ensure a success of the joint project with a certain probability.
Thus, the higher the quality of a given rm, the lower the minimum required quality of the partner. More
specically, the rate at which rmsqualities can be substituted so that the joint project is implemented
depends on the required contributions of rms A and B to the partnership. This rate, which is given by
 A=B (or equivalently by  A=(1   A)), is increasing (in absolute value) in rm As contribution A.
This implies that the higher A, the higher the increment in rm Bs quality required to compensate for a
given reduction in rm As quality for the project to be implemented.
We now characterize how a partnership a¤ects the evolution of rms reputations in a higher quality
partners equilibrium. Although the impact of a success or a failure of the joint project on rmsreputations
has already been discussed, for completeness we include this result in Proposition 3. In Proposition 3, we
also characterize the impact of the decision to form a partnership on rmsreputations, and the combined
impact of the decision to form a partnership and of the performance of the joint project on rmsreputations.
Proposition 3 In any higher quality partners equilibrium (i) rmsreputations (weakly) increase following
the decision to implement the joint project, (ii) a rms reputation may increase or decrease following a
success or a failure of the joint project, and (iii) rms reputations following a success of the joint project
are higher than their initial reputations.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The rst part of Proposition 3 compares rmsinterim and initial reputations. The di¤erence between
them is that interim reputations incorporate the signalling e¤ect associated with the decision to implement
the joint project. Since in a higher quality partners equilibrium rms implement the joint project if and only
if their qualities are relatively high, the decision to implement the joint project signals high quality.24 This
explains why rmsinterim reputations are higher than their initial reputations. Thus, the decision to form a
partnership and implement the joint project signals high quality. The second part of the Proposition, which
compares a rms ex-post and interim reputations, highlights an important di¤erence between joint projects
and projects implemented by a single rm. While in the case where a rm implements a project alone its
reputation always increases following a success and decreases following a failure, in the case where a rm
implements a project through a partnership the opposite may happen. The third part of the Proposition
relates rmsex-post and initial reputations. The di¤erence between the two reects the combined impact of
there are situations where it is unique. This is the case, for example, when GA and GB are uniform distributions and rms
contributions to the partnership are identical (i.e., A = B = 1=2).
24The only possible case of a higher quality partners equilibrium in which rmsreputations do not strictly increase following
the decision to form a partnership is that where only rms with qualities qA = qB = 0 do not form a partnership.
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the signalling e¤ect associated with the decision to form a partnership and of the e¤ect of the performance
of the joint project on consumersbeliefs. The Proposition states that when the e¤ect of a success of the
joint project on a rms reputation is negative, this e¤ect is dominated by the positive signalling e¤ect.
We now study how rms initial reputations a¤ect the impact of a partnership on rms joint prot
and, therefore, the decision to form a partnership. By a¤ecting the reputation with which the joint project
is launched, a rms reputation has an obvious positive impact on rmsjoint prot under a partnership.
However, a rms reputation may also have a negative impact on its partners reputation and, thereby,
on joint prot. This is so because the higher the rms reputation, the more consumers will tend to give
this rm the credit in case of a success of the joint project and to disregard its responsibility in case of a
failure. Proposition 4 captures this e¤ect by showing that a rm may be more demanding in terms of a
partners quality when the partners reputation is high than when it is low. For convenience, we focus on
the higher quality partners equilibrium in which the set of rmsqualities for which a partnership is formed
is the greatest.25 In our setting, this corresponds to the higher quality partners equilibrium with the lowest
combined quality threshold above which rms form a partnership.
Proposition 4 A higher reputation of one of the rms may increase the lowest combined quality threshold
level above which rms implement the joint project in a higher quality partners equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
An immediate consequence of Proposition 4 is that rmsjoint prot under a partnership and, as a result,
rmsincentive to form a partnership do not necessarily increase with the reputation of a given partner. A
partners reputation has a positive or negative impact on joint prots depending on the relative strength
of the two e¤ects mentioned above. In particular, when the other rms future projects are su¢ ciently
important relative to the joint project, the second e¤ect is likely to dominate.
The results presented in this section have important implications for partner selection in situations where
individual implementation of the joint project is not possible. The existing literature on partner selection
largely focuses on rmsneed to access complementary assets or on organizational learning as the key deter-
minants of partner selection (e.g., Geringer, 1988; Hitt et al, 2000). In contrast, we take complementarity as
given and analyze how the quality and reputation of the potential partners a¤ect the dynamics of reputation
formation and, thereby, rms incentives to form a partnership. We dene a partnership broadly as any
situation where two or more parties contribute to the performance of a given project. Thus, our results
apply, for example, not only to partner selection in joint-ventures, but also to the selection of trading part-
ners such as retailers or suppliers. In our setting, the best partner is the one for which the increase in total
prots associated with a partnership is the largest. In a higher quality partners equilibrium, a higher quality
25We say that a set S1 is greater than a set S2 if S2  S1.
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partner is always preferable to a lower quality partner. This is because a success of the joint project leads
to a higher future joint prot than a failure and the probability of success increases with rmsqualities.
However, a higher reputation partner is not always preferable to a lower reputation partner, because the
impact on a rms reputation of having a higher reputation partner may be negative.
5 Individual vs. Joint Implementation
In this section, we assume that the joint project may be implemented not only jointly but also by either of
the two rms alone.26 This allows us to analyze the main reputational trade-o¤s associated with the choice
between joint and individual implementation of a project.
When individual implementation is possible, the best alternative to a partnership may be implementation
by a single rm. If this is the case, an increase in the quality of that rm a¤ects not only rmsjoint prot
under a partnership, but also under the best alternative to a partnership. As shown below, this introduces two
main di¤erences relative to the results presented in Section 4. First, in a higher quality partners equilibrium,
where a success of the joint project leads to a higher joint prot than a failure, an increase in rmscombined
quality may decrease rmsincentive to form a partnership. Second, rmsqualities may be complements,
meaning that at the margin a higher quality rm may require a higher quality partner to form a partnership.
In general, a rm that has the opportunity to develop a new project faces di¤erent implementation
options. First, the rm may stretch its reputation to the new project, by implementing it alone. This
may be accomplished by marketing the product resulting from the project under the rms existing brand,
a practice that has been designated as brand stretchingor umbrella branding (e.g., Wernerfelt, 1988;
Cabral, 2000). In addition, the rm may combine its reputation with that of another rm, by implementing
the project through a partnership. Finally, the rm may associate the reputation (and quality) of another
rm to the project, by selling the project to that rm, who would implement it alone. In our setting, a rms
reputation and quality are nonseparable. Hence, the only way to fully associate the reputation of another
rm to the new project is by letting that rm implement the project alone.
The decision of how to implement the joint project involves a basic trade-o¤. Through individual imple-
mentation, rms associate the reputation of one of them to the project. However, doing so may create too
much exposurefor that rm, as it is fully responsible for the performance of the project. Thus, even if the
reputation of, let us say, rm A is high and can therefore be used to boost consumersperceptions of the
project, individual implementation by rm B and joint implementation have the advantage of allowing rm
A to insulate its reputation fully or partially from the performance of the project.27
26 In spite of the fact that in this section the period one project may be implemented by either of the two rms alone, for
convenience we continue to call it the joint project.
27The paper by Lang (2003) on team formation studies a related problem. Specically, Lang analyzes the incentives of two
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Throughout this section, we continue to assume that only a subset of measure zero of the set of possible
pairs of rms are endowed with a joint project at the beginning of period one. We also assume that a subset
of positive measure of those rms that are not endowed with a joint project are endowed with an individual
project that they always implement. Thus, while consumers do not expect rms to form partnerships and
implement joint projects in period one, they do expect rms to implement individual projects. Moreover,
since rms always implement their individual projects, a rms reputation does not change following the
decision to implement an individual project.28 Finally, we assume that consumers are unable to distinguish
a rms individual project from a joint project that is implemented individually by the rm. This assumption,
together with the fact that rms are expected to implement individual projects (but not joint projects) with
positive probability imply that after observing a rm implementing a project alone consumers always infer
that it is an individual project of that rm. This means that, from a reputational point of view, consumers
treat joint projects implemented by a single rm as individual projects of that rm, and so do we in this
section.
Since we are interested in analyzing rmsdecisions to form partnerships, we consider the case of two
rms that are endowed with a joint project at the beginning of period one. We denote them by rm A
and rm B. For simplicity, we consider throughout this section the case where only rm A is endowed
with a basic product in period two. Thus, the performance of the joint project is relevant only to the
extent that it may a¤ect rm As ex-post reputation. As before, we assume that if rms A and B form
a partnership to implement the joint project, they do so with exogenous participation levels A and B .
Firmsimplementation decision is denoted by  2 fA;B; Pg, where  = A if rm A implements the project
alone,  = B if rm B implements the project alone, and  = P if rms form a partnership.
We now study how rmsqualities a¤ect the implementation decision of the joint project. We start by
characterizing the best alternative to a partnership. In our setting, if rm B implements the joint project
alone, it associates its reputation to the joint project and rm A associates its reputation which remains
unchanged to its period two product. Thus, rmsjoint prot is rBV +rAVA. This is greater than the joint
prot in the situation where the joint project is not implemented, which is rAVA. Thus, the best alternative
agents, who are concerned with their reputations, to pool their productions by forming a team, when they could continue to
produce separately. As in our case, the decision to work jointly (rather than remain separate) allows agents to mitigate the
impact of their own performance on their reputation. While in Lang (2003) forming a partnership is a signal of quality because
teaming costs decrease with qualities, we consider that partnership formation is cost neutral. In our case, forming a partnership
is a signal of quality because quality a¤ects performance, which in turn a¤ects future reputations.
28The assumption that rms always implement individual projects simplies the analysis, but is not crucial to obtain the
results presented in this section. The results would be qualitatively the same if we assumed instead that only higher quality rms
implement their individual projects in period one if they are endowed with one. This would imply an increase in reputation
following the implementation of an individual project and a decrease in reputation in case the rm did not implement any
project in period one.
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to a partnership is either implementation by rm A alone or implementation by rm B alone.
Lemma 2 The best alternative to a partnership is implementation by rm A alone if
qA  rA +
rA(1  rA)
var(eqA)VA (rB   rA)V  qA; (5.1)
where var(eqA) is the variance of eqA according to the prior GA(). Otherwise, the best alternative to a
partnership is implementation by rm B alone.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Condition (5.1) highlights the main trade-o¤s involved in the choice between individual implementation
by rm A or by rm B. One the one hand, rms take into account the prots associated with the joint project.
If V is high, the reputation with which the project is launched is important. This favors implementation
by the rm with the highest reputation. On the other hand, rms take into account the impact of the
performance of the joint project on the future reputation of rm A, which a¤ects its period two prot. If
rm A has a high quality and implements the joint project, a success occurs with high probability. This
implies an improvement in the reputation of rm A. In contrast, if rm A has a low quality and implements
the joint project the reverse happens. Hence, a high quality of rm A favors individual implementation by
rm A relative to individual implementation by rm B, and vice-versa.
We now study rmschoice between individual implementation of the joint project (rm A or rm B) and
joint implementation through a partnership. An implementation strategy of the joint project by rms A and
B is a mapping (q; ) that for each quality vector q assigns rmsprobability of choosing implementation
form  2 fA;B; Pg.
As in the case where only joint implementation of the project is possible (Section 4), here there also exists
an equilibrium in which rms never form a partnership. Again, this equilibrium exists because the notion
of Bayesian equilibrium does not impose any restriction on beliefs associated with zero-probability events.
Thus, making consumersbeliefs su¢ ciently unfavorable to rms in the event they form a partnership, we
can support an equilibrium in which rms never implement the joint project jointly.
Proposition 5 states that when individual implementation of the joint project is also possible there exists
no equilibrium where rms implement the joint project through a partnership regardless of their qualities.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the joint project can be implemented either through a partnership or individu-
ally. Then, a pooling equilibrium in which rms form a partnership independently of their qualities does not
exist.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The result in Proposition 5 contrasts with that in Proposition 1, where we establish that when only joint
implementation is possible and V is su¢ ciently high, there is an equilibrium in which rms implement the
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joint project regardless of their qualities. When only joint implementation is possible, the only alternative
to a partnership is not to implement the project at all. This creates pressure on rms to form a partnership
to appropriate the high value generated by the joint project. In contrast, when individual implementation
is possible rms can capture the prots associated with the joint project without forming a partnership.
We now analyze semiseparating equilibria. Again, we focus on higher quality partners equilibria, where
rms are better o¤ if a joint project that is implemented through a partnership succeeds than if it fails. As in
Section 4, lower quality partners equilibria, where rms are better o¤ if a joint project that is implemented
through a partnership fails than if it succeeds, do not exist if sabotage is possible.
In contrast with Section 4, here the characterization of equilibria depends on whether the best alternative
to a partnership is individual implementation by rm A (i.e., qA > qA) or by rm B (i.e., qA < q

A).
Proposition 6 Suppose that the joint project can be implemented either through a partnership or individually
and consider any higher quality partners equilibrium. For qA < qA, rms form a partnership if and only if
their combined quality AqA + BqB is above a threshold quality level. For qA > qA, such threshold quality
levels no longer exist, since rms incentive to form a partnership may decrease as rmscombined quality
increases.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
For qA < qA, the characterization of higher quality partners equilibria is similar to that in the case
where individual implementation is not possible: rms form a partnership whenever their combined quality
is su¢ ciently high. For qA > qA, rmsdecision to form a partnership is no longer characterized by such a
cuto¤ rule in terms of rmscombined qualities.
The intuition is the following. In a higher quality partners equilibrium, the joint prot under a partnership
is increasing in rmscombined quality. For qA < qA, the best alternative to a partnership is individual
implementation by rm B. As in the case where individual implementation is not possible, the joint prot
under the best alternative to a partnership is independent of rmsqualities. Thus, the higher the rms
combined qualities the higher their incentives to form a partnership. For qA > qA, the joint prot under the
best alternative to a partnership (individual implementation by rm A) is increasing in rm As quality. This
implies that an increase in rmscombined quality which may involve, for example, a signicant increase
in qA and a decrease in qB no longer implies that rmsincentive to form a partnership increases. Indeed
it may decrease.
Proposition 6 implies that, for qA < qA, qualities are always substitutes, in the sense that the marginal
rate at which rmsqualities can be exchanged so that their incentive to form a partnership remains constant
is negative. More specically, this rate is  A=B , which is the rate at which qualities qA and qB can be
exchanged to keep rmscombined quality constant. In contrast, for qA > qA, qualities may be complements,
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in the sense that the marginal rate at which rmsqualities can be exchanged so that their incentive to form
a partnership remains constant is positive. When qA > qA, an increase in rm As quality increases the joint
prot under the best alternative to a partnership, individual implementation by rm A. Thus, the marginal
rate at which rmsqualities can be exchanged so that their incentive to form a partnership remains constant
is greater when qA > qA than when qA < q

A. It may even happen that when rm As quality increases, rm
Bs quality also has to increase for rmsincentive to form a partnership to remain constant. In Example 2,
we present a higher quality partners equilibrium where this is the case.
The fact that in a higher quality partners equilibrium qualities may be complements implies that rms
incentive to form a partnership may decrease when the quality of one of the rms increases. Thus, when
both individual and joint implementation of the joint project are possible, a higher quality partner is not
necessarily preferable to a lower quality partner.29 This contrasts with the results obtained in Section 4
for the case where individual implementation is not possible. In that case, qualities are always substitutes
and in a higher quality partners equilibrium a higher quality partner is always preferable to a lower quality
partner.
Example 2 Suppose that rmsqualities, as initially perceived by consumers, are uniformly distributed, i.e.,
gi(qi) = 1 for all qi 2 [0; 1] , i 2 fA;Bg. Suppose also that A = 0:95, B = 0:05, V = 0 and VA = 20.
In this case, qA = rA = 0:5. The following strategy constitutes a higher quality partners equilibrium: (i)
if qA  0:5, form a partnership if 0:95qA + 0:05qB > 0:1943 and let rm B implement the joint project
alone if otherwise; and (ii) if qA > 0:5, form a partnership if qB   12:4917qA >  11: 860 and let rm A
implement the joint project alone if otherwise. In this equilibrium, the decision to form a partnership is
a good signal of rms qualities  rm As and rm Bs initial reputations are 0.5, whereas their interim
reputations in the event a partnership is formed are 0:5811 and 0:5111, respectively. Further, following the
formation of a partnership, rm As ex-post reputation is 0:4589 if the joint project fails and 0:6706 if it
succeeds. Finally, when rms choose individual implementation (either by rm A or by rm B), their initial
and interim reputations are identical (and equal to 0.5), and only the ex-post reputation of the rm that
implements the project is a¤ected by the projects performance. This reputation is 2/3 if the project performs
well, and 1/3 if it does not. The equilibrium implementation strategy of the joint project is represented in
Figure 1.
In this example, since the value of the joint project is zero, the implementation decision of the joint project
is important only because it a¤ects rm As future reputation. In the example, qualities are complements
29Segendor¤ (2000) obtains a similar result. Segendor¤ shows that a competent leader may choose an incompetent co-worker
for insurance motives: if things go wrong, the leader can then blame the co-worker and keep his/her reputation intact. The
underlying mechanisms in Segendor¤ (2000) and in our paper are di¤erent though, since in Segendor¤ (2000) the leader has
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Figure 1: A higher quality partners equilibrium when individual implementation is feasible.
when rm As quality is high. The intuition is the following. When rm A has a high quality, the best
alternative to a partnership is individual implementation by rm A. In addition, the higher the quality of
rm A, the more attractive this alternative becomes relative to a partnership. Since in this equilibrium
rmsprot from a partnership increases with rm Bs quality, the higher the quality of rm A the higher
the required quality of rm B for a partnership to be formed.
In Figure 1, we can identify three regions in the space of rmsqualities. Each region corresponds to a
di¤erent implementation decision of the joint project. In Region 1, rm B implements the joint project alone.
In this region, since rm As quality is relatively low and this rm is the major contributor to the partnership
(A = 0:95), the probability of success of the joint project is low both when rm A implements the project
alone and under the partnership. Thus, any of these implementation decisions would jeopardize rm As
future reputation. Implementation by rm B alone insulates rm As future reputation from the performance
of the joint project. In Region 2, forming a partnership is optimal. In this region, rmscombined qualities
are su¢ ciently high to generate a probability of success of the joint project, when implemented through a
partnership, that ensures an increase in rm As future reputation relative to its initial reputation. As a
result, the partnership dominates individual implementation by rm B. In addition, in this region rm Bs
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quality is su¢ ciently high (and/or rm As quality is su¢ ciently low) for individual implementation by rm
A to be dominated by the partnership. Finally, in Region 3 rm As quality is so high that implementation
by rm A alone dominates implementation by rm B alone. Furthermore, since the quality of rm B is
relatively low, forming a partnership is also dominated by individual implementation by rm A.
Let us assume that rm A, the rm whose future reputation matters, is the one that initially faces the
opportunity to develop the joint project. In this case, we can interpret the regions discussed above in terms
of the choice among stretching an existing reputation, fully associating the reputation of another rm to the
project, and combining reputations through a partnership, when implementing a new project. Specically,
in Region 1 rm A fully associates the reputation of rm B to the project by selling the project to that rm;
in Region 2 rm A combines its reputation with that of rm B through a partnership; and in Region 3 rm
A stretches its reputation by implementing the project alone.
Example 2 illustrates important aspects of the management of reputations when rms face the opportunity
to develop a new project. Let us again take the perspective of rm A. When rm As quality is considerably
lower than its initial reputation, rm A optimally avoids participating in projects with low value-creation
potential per se, unless its partner has a very high quality. This allows rm A to conceal its true quality and
to protect its reputation for future use in projects where a good reputation allows it to create high value. In
contrast, when rm As initial reputation is considerably lower than its quality, rm A has the incentive to
participate in projects (even of low value) in order to improve its reputation. Finally, when rm As quality
and initial reputation are close, rm A is more prone to form a partnership, as it is neither very reluctant to
participate in projects to hide its true quality nor very eager to implement them alone in order to improve
a reputation that is much lower than its true quality.30
This discussion emphasizes that a rms decision to stretch an existing reputation, to combine this
reputation with that of another rm, or to fully associate the reputation of another rm to a project crucially
depends on the relative position of the rms own quality and reputation. A higher reputation relative to
true quality induces rms to be more conservative and selective in terms of project implementation. A lower
reputation relative to true quality induces rms to be more entrepreneurial and implement more projects,
in order to raise their public image.
6 Conclusion
An important feature of many markets is the existence of information asymmetries about relevant char-
acteristics of rms. In such cases, reputations are critical intangible assets. Furthermore, the increasing
30These results hold in general, unless the value of the joint project is signicantly greater than the value of the rms future
projects. In such cases, the implementation decision is the one that maximizes the prot generated by the joint project, meaning
that the rm with the best reputation implements the project individually.
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complexity of products and tasks that have to be performed requires an increasing level of specialization,
which, in turn, induces rms to increasingly participate in joint projects. In this paper, we study the repu-
tational implications of joint projects and rmsincentives to participate in such projects when reputational
considerations are important.
Although we frame our analysis in terms of interaction among rms, most of the insights generated in this
paper also apply to situations where individuals, countries or other organizations engage in joint projects.
The extent to which our results directly apply to these settings may depend, however, on the assumption
of payo¤ transferability between partners. When payo¤s are not transferable, it may be more di¢ cult to
convince a party to participate in a partnership if doing so may damage its reputation.
Throughout this paper we assume that the reputation and fundamental characteristics (in our case,
the quality) of the reputation holder are nonseparable. This nonseparability limits the transferability or
tradeability of reputations. For example, it may not be easy for a rm whose products have performed
poorly to buy customers trust in its products.31 Similarly, a well-known scholar cannot sell his or her
reputation for producing high-quality research to another less-known scholar. There are certainly situations
where reputations are separable and can therefore be traded. When reputations are embedded in names, the
market for names corresponds to a market for reputations (e.g., Tadelis, 1999, 2002; Mailath and Samuelson,
2001).32 However, a market for names may not exist. Individuals and countries, for instance, cannot buy or
sell a name. Even in the case of rms, where markets for names do exist, names may not carry the underlying
reputation. In a model where a rms name is known to all potential customers, Tadelis (1999) obtains that
names only carry the underlying reputation to the extent that shifts in ownership are (at least partially)
unobservable. In contrast, Hakenes and Peitz (2007) show that, when the name of a rm has a meaning
only for the (previous) customers of that rm, names may carry the underlying reputation even if ownership
changes are observable. When the reputation and the fundamental characteristics of the reputation holder
are separable, parties can insulate their reputations from the consequences of their participation in joint
projects. This may be achieved by creating a new brand (or buying an existing one) and associating it with
the joint project. Under nonseparability this is not possible.
A nal note about e¢ ciency. In our model, total expected surplus is higher when the joint project
succeeds than when it fails, except in the obvious case where the joint project has zero value. Therefore,
e¢ ciency considerations dictate that when individual implementation is possible, the higher-quality rm
31As Arrow (1974, p. 23) puts it: Unfortunately, [trust] is not a commodity which can be bought very easily. [...] Trust and
similar values, loyalty and truthtelling, are examples of what the economist would call externalities. They are goods, they are
commodities; they have real, practical economic value; [...] But they are not commodities for which trade on the open market
is technically possible or even meaningful.
32The assumption that rmsreputations and qualities are separable is also implicit in the literature on brand extension (e.g.,
Wernerfelt, 1988; Cabral, 2000), which associates reputations with brands. Thus, by launching a new product under a totally
new brand, a rm associates its quality to that product, but not its existing reputation.
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should always implement the joint project alone in order to maximize its probability of success. Our results




A.1. A lower quality partners equilibrium (when only joint implementation is possible)
Here we present an example of a lower quality partners equilibrium when only joint implementation of
the joint project is possible. We consider a case where rmsqualities can take any value in the interval
[0; 1].
Example 3 Suppose that rmsqualities are initially perceived by consumers as identically distributed. More
specically, suppose that
gi(qi) =
8<: 0:1 if qi  0:73:1 if qi > 0:7 ,
for all i 2 fA;Bg. With these distributions, rms initial reputations are ri = 0:815 for all i 2 fA;Bg.
Suppose also that A is 0:2, B = 0:8, VA = 1, VB = 0 and V = 0:31176.
For these values, an implementation strategy in which rms implement the joint project i¤ q 2 fq 2
[0; 1]2 : 0:2qA + (0:8)qB < 0:7g constitutes an equilibrium. In this equilibrium, rms reputations decrease
when consumers observe that rms decided to implement the project jointly. More specically, rmsinterim
reputations are r0A = 0:682 34 and r
0
B = 0:427 42. After observing that rms formed a partnership and
implemented the joint project, consumers perceive rms qualities as negatively correlated (cov(eqA; eqB) =
 0:04432). This is because consumers know that in equilibrium the higher the quality of a rm, the lower
the maximum allowed quality of a partner.
This negative correlation dominates the e¤ect of the variance of eqA in (3.4) (which in this example is
0:08 449), generating an ex-post reputation of rm A that is higher when the joint project fails than when it
succeeds. Specically, these reputations are r00A(f) = 0:717 93 (which is greater than the interim reputation)
and r00A(s) = 0:643 54, respectively. Thus, in this equilibrium rms reputations decrease relative to the
initial reputations. Firm A is better o¤ in terms of reputation when the joint project fails than when it
succeeds. As a result, rms implement the joint project only when they expect the joint project to succeed
with a low probability, i.e., only when their qualities are low. We represent graphically the rmsequilibrium
implementation strategy in Figure 2.
A.2. Proofs and auxiliary results
First we show that when individual implementation of the joint project is not possible, a lower quality
partners equilibrium can exist only if V > 0, and a lower quality partners equilibrium in which the reputation
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Partnership formation -
implementation of the joint
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Figure 2: Lower quality partners equilibrium.
Proof. To see that a lower quality partners equilibrium does not exist when V = 0, consider the case
of rms with qualities q = (0; 0) in such an equilibrium. Their joint prot is r00A(f)VA + r
00
B(f)VB if they
implement the joint project, and rAVA + rBVB if they do not. Since r00i (f) < ri for all i 2 fA;Bg in any
lower quality partners equilibrium (see Lemma 3 below), rms are better o¤ not implementing the joint
project. This is a contradiction, since by denition of lower quality partners equilibrium rms with qualities
q = (0; 0) implement the joint project.
We next prove the second part of the result. Consider a lower quality partners equilibrium. From Lemma
1, it follows that in such an equilibrium
A[r
00





where the var(AeqA + AeqB) is according to interim beliefs H1(q). Hence, (6.1) is positive. Suppose now
that r00A(s) < r
00










(6.1) is positive. By denition of lower quality partners equilibrium, it follows that
[r00A(s)  r00A(f)]VA + [r00B(s)  r00B(f)]VB < 0. (6.2)
From the fact that (i) (6.1) is positive, (ii) r00A(s) < r
00




B(f), it follows that (6.2) is
possible only if A < VA=(VA + VB). This completes the proof.
Lemma 3 Suppose only joint implementation of the joint project is possible. Let (q) denote rms im-
plementation strategy satisfying (q) = 1 if q 2 f(qA; qB) 2 [0; 1]2 : AqA + BqB > zg and (q) = 0 if
otherwise, for z 2 [0; 1). Similarly, let (q) denote rms implementation strategy satisfying (q) = 1 if
q 2 f(qA; qB) 2 [0; 1]2 : AqA + BqB < zg and (q) = 0 if otherwise, for z 2 (0; 1]. Given implementation
strategy (q), the ex-post reputation of rm i 2 fA;Bg following a success of the joint project is greater than
its initial reputation, i.e., r00i (s) > ri. Further, given implementation strategy (q), the ex-post reputation of
rm i 2 fA;Bg following a failure of the joint project is smaller than its initial reputation, i.e., r00i (f) < ri.
Proof. By denition r00i (') = E[eqi j '], where E[eqi j '] corresponds to the expected value of eqi according
to the posterior H2(q j' ), for ' 2 ff; sg. Using standard notation, it follows by the law of iterated expecta-
tions that r00i (') = Eq ifE[eqi j '; q i] j 'g. Thus, su¢ cient conditions for the results in the Lemma are that
given implementation strategy 1(q) (respectively 2(q)), E[eqi j s; q i] > ri (resp. E[eqi j f; q i] < ri) for all
q i such that h2(q j' ) > 0 for some qi. E[eqi j '; q i] is the expected value of eqi according to the ex-post
conditional distribution of eqi given q i. Denoting the density associated with this conditional distribution
by h2(qi j'; q i ), by the law of conditional probabilities we have that




where h2; i(q i j' ) =
R
h2(q j' )dqi denotes the ex-post marginal distribution of eq i. Therefore, from (4.2)
it follows that given an implementation strategy (q),
h2(qi j'; q i ) =
Pr[' j q](q)gi(qi)Z
Pr[' j bq](bq)gi(bqi)dbqi .
Suppose rst that (q) = (q). Fix q i such that (q) > 0 for some qi. (This implies that given q i,
h2(q j' ) > 0 for some qi.) Because Pr[s j q] is strictly increasing in qi (recall that Pr[s j q] = AqA + BqB)
and (q) is non-decreasing in qi (recall that (q) = 0 if qi  zi +
 i
i
q i and (q) = 1 if otherwise),
H2(qi js; q i ) rst-order stochastically dominates Gi(qi) and H2(qi js; q i ) < Gi(qi) on some open subset of
[0; 1]. This implies that E[eqi j s; q i] > ri.
Suppose now that (q) = (q). Fix q i such that (q) > 0 for some qi. Because Pr[f j q] is strictly
decreasing in qi (recall that Pr[f j q] = 1 AqA BqB) and (q) is non-increasing in qi (recall that (q) = 1
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if qi < zi +
 i
i
q i and (q) = 0 if otherwise), Gi(qi) rst-order stochastically dominates H2(qi jf; q i ) and
Gi(qi) < H2(qi jf; q i ) on some open subset of [0; 1]. This implies that E[eqi j f; q i] < ri, which concludes
the proof.
Proof of Lemma 1. By denition,
r00i (') =
Z
qidH2(q j' ). (6.3)
Because H2(q j' ) is obtained through Bayes rule from H1(q), it follows that
h2(q j' ) =
Pr[' j q]h1(q)Z
Pr[' j bq]dH1(bq) .
Applying this result in (6.3) and using standard integration properties, we can write
r00i (') =
Z
qi Pr[' j q]dH1(q)Z
Pr[' j bq]dH1(bq) . (6.4)
From (6.4) and the fact that Pr[s j q] = AqA + BqB and Pr[f j q] = 1  AqA   BqB , it follows that
r00i (s) =







r0i   iE[eq2i ] + (1  i)E[eqAeqB ]
1  Ar0A   Br0B
; (6.6)
where E[eq2i ] and E[eqAeqB ] are expected values according to interim beliefs H1(q).
The results in the Lemma follow by subtracting r0i from both sides of (6.5) and (6.6), and using the fact
that var(ey) = E(ey2)   E2(ey) and cov(ey1; ey2) = E(ey1ey2)   E(ey1)E(ey2) for any given random variables ey, ey1,
and ey2.
Proof of Lemma 2. We begin by introducing some additional notation. Let j(q) denote rmsjoint
prot under individual implementation of the joint project by rm j 2 fA;Bg. Moreover, let brA(') denote
rm As reputation if rm A implements the joint project alone and the performance of the joint project is ' 2
ff; sg. First, note that B(q) = rBV +rAVA  rAVA = 0(q), which implies that individual implementation
of the joint project by rm B always dominates no implementation of the joint project. Thus, the best
alternative to a partnership is either individual implementation by rm A or individual implementation by
rm B. We now compare these two alternatives. Note that A(q) = rAV + fqAbrA(s) + (1   qA)brA(f)gVA.
Applying Lemma 1 when A = 1 and noting that when rm A implements the joint project alone consumers
interim beliefs are identical to their initial beliefs, we obtain that brA(s) = rA + (1=rA)  var(eqA) and
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brA(f) = rA   (1=(1   rA))  var(eqA). Using this and the fact that brA(s) > brA(f), we immediately obtain
that A(q)  B(q) is equivalent to (5.1).
Proof of Proposition 1. In a pooling equilibrium with full implementation, consumersinterim beliefs
about rmsqualities are identical to their initial beliefs  note from (4.1) that h1(q) = g(q) for all q 2 [0; 1]2,
when (q) = 1 for all q 2 [0; 1]2. This has two implications. First, r0i = ri for all i 2 fA;Bg. Second,
cov(eqA; eqB) according to interim beliefs is 0, since rms qualities are initially perceived as independent.
Because cov(eqA; eqB) according to interim beliefs is 0, Lemma 1 implies that r00i (s)   r00i (f) > 0 for all
i 2 fA;Bg. Thus, rms joint prot associated with implementing the joint project is increasing in both
qA and qB . This, together with the fact that rmsjoint prot associated with not implementing the joint
project does not depend on rms qualities, implies that a pooling equilibrium with full implementation
exists if and only if rms with qualities q = (0; 0) are better o¤ forming the partnership than not forming it,
i.e., P (0; 0) > rAVA + rBVB . Using the fact that r0i = ri for all i 2 fA;Bg and Lemma 1 to substitute for
r00i (f), we immediately obtain that this condition holds if and only if V > V
.
Proof of Proposition 2. We rst show that a higher quality partners equilibrium always exists when
V < V . Let z(q) denote the following implementation strategy: z(q) = 1 if q 2 f(qA; qB) 2 [0; 1]2 :
AqA + BqB > zg and z(q) = 0 if otherwise. Let r0i;z for i 2 fA;Bg denote the interim reputations of
rms A and B implied by the implementation strategy z(q), i.e., the reputations obtained from the interim
posterior (4.1) when (q) = z(q). In a similar way, let r00i;z(s) and r
00
i;z(f) for i 2 fA;Bg denote the ex-post
reputations of rms A and B implied by the implementation strategy z(q), i.e., the reputations obtained
from the ex-post posterior (4.2) when (q) = z(q). Given these reputations, rmsexpected joint prot if
they implement the joint project is greater than their joint prot if they do not implement it i¤
AqA + BqB >
P
i=A,B




as long as X
i=A,B
[r00i;z(s)  r00i;z(f)]Vi > 0. (6.8)
We establish existence of a higher quality partners equilibrium (when V < V ) by showing that there exists
z 2 [0; 1) such that (6.8) holds when z = z and n(z) = z.
When z = 0, r00i;z(s) and r
00
i;z(f) for all i 2 fA,Bg are the same as in an equilibrium in which rms
implement the joint project independently of their qualities, since only rms with qualities q = (0; 0) do
not implement the joint project and these are of measure zero because g(q) is atomless. This implies that
r00i;z=0(s) > r
00
i;z=0(f) for all i 2 fA,Bg, which in turn implies that the denominator of n(0) is positive. For
V = V  the numerator of n(0) is zero. Thus, n(0)  0 when V  V .
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Consider now the smallest z such that
P
i=A;B
[ri   r00i;z(f)]Vi = 0. Denote it by z0. Note that z0 exists and
z0 2 (0; 1), since, for i 2 fA;Bg, ri > r00i;z=0(f), limz!1 r00i;z(f) = 1, and r00i;z(f) is a continuous function of z.
From Lemma 3 (see Appendix A.2), r00i;z(s) > ri for all z 2 [0; 1). Therefore, for all z 2 [0; z0] the denominator





i;z(f) are all continuous functions of z for all i 2 fA;Bg.) Second, it implies that n(z0) < 0,
since the second term in the numerator of n(z) is always positive and, by denition of z0, the rst term in
the numerator of n(z) is zero. Now, if n(0) = 0 then let z = 0. If n(0) > 0, then existence of z 2 (0; z0) is
guaranteed by continuity of n(z) for z 2 [0; z0] and by the fact that n(z0) < 0.
We now prove the second part of the Proposition. For an example where a lower quality partners
equilibrium exists, and its characterization, see Example 3 in Appendix A.1. For examples of situations
where a lower quality partners equilibrium does not exist note that we have shown in the rst part of
Appendix A.2 that a lower quality partners equilibrium can exist only if V > 0, and that a lower quality
partners equilibrium in which the reputation of rm i 2 fA;Bg decreases following a success of the joint
project can exist only if i < Vi=(VA + VB).
Proof of Proposition 3. We start by showing point (i) of the Proposition. This is equivalent to
showing that r0i  ri in any higher quality partners equilibrium for all i 2 fA;Bg. Let E[eqi] be the expected
value of eqi according to the interim distribution H1(q). By denition r0i = E[eqi]. By the law of iterated
expectations we can write r0i = Eq ifE[eqi j q i]g. Thus, a su¢ cient condition for point (i) of the Proposition
to hold is that in any higher quality partners equilibrium, E[eqi j q i]  ri for all q i such that h1(q) > 0
for some qi. The E[eqi j q i] is the expected value of eqi according to the interim conditional distribution ofeqi given q i. Denote the density associated with this conditional distribution by h1(qi jq i ). By the law of
conditional probabilities






h1(q)dqi. Consider an equilibrium where rmsimplementation strategy is (q). From
(6.9) and (4.1), it follows that in this equilibrium
h1(qi jq i ) =
(q)gi(qi)Z
(bq)gi(bqi)dbqi .
Fix q i such that (q) > 0 for some qi. (This implies that given q i, h1(q) > 0 for some qi.) Because
(q) is non-decreasing in qi in a higher quality partners equilibrium (recall that in this type of equilibrium
(q) = 0 if qi  zi +
 i
i
q i and (q) = 1 if otherwise), H1(qi jq i ) rst-order stochastically dominates
Gi(qi), which implies that E[eqi j q i]  ri. This completes the proof that r0i  ri in a higher quality partners
equilibrium for all i 2 fA;Bg.
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To prove point (ii) of the Proposition, we provide here an example where rmstypes are continuous
inspired by Example 1, a two-type rms example. Suppose that gi(qi) = d if qA 2 [d; 1   d] and gi(qi) = 
2d2   d+ 1

=2d if otherwise, for all i 2 fA;Bg. Note that when d goes to 0, this distribution collapses in the
distribution in Example 1. Let d = 0:1, A = 1=4 (which implies B = 3=4), V = 0:5, VA = 2, and VB = 5.
Let also n(z), r00i;z(') and r
0
i;z for all i 2 fA;Bg and for all ' 2 ff; sg be as dened in the Proof of Proposition




i;z(s)   r00i;z(f)]Vi > 0 for
all z 2 [0:1; 0:225], which implies that n(z) is continuous in [0:1; 0:225]; and (c) r00A;z(s) < r0A;z < r00A;z(f) for
all z 2 [0:1; 0:225]. It follows from (a) and (b) that there exists an equilibrium where rms implement the
joint project i¤ AqA + BqB > z from some z 2 (0:1; 0:225), and from (c) that in such an equilibrium
the reputation of rm A increases (resp. decreases) following a failure (resp. success) of the joint project.
Point (iii) of the Proposition, which is equivalent to the statement that in a higher quality partners
equilibrium r00i (s) > ri for all i 2 fA;Bg, follows directly from Lemma 3 in Appendix A.2.
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that V = VB = 0. Let g1B and g
2
B denote two possible prior
distributions of rm Bs quality. Given prior gA of rm As quality and rmscontributions A and B ,
let r00A;z;j(f) and r
00
A;z;j(s) denote the ex-post reputations of rm A that are implied by the implementation
strategy z(q) = 1 if q 2 f(qA; qB) 2 [0; 1]2 : AqA + BqB > zg and z(q) = 0 if otherwise, when the prior
distribution of rm Bs quality is gjB , for all j 2 f1; 2g. Furthermore, let zj denote the lowest combined
quality threshold level above which rms implement the joint project in a higher quality partners equilibrium
when the prior distribution of rm Bs quality is gjB , for all j 2 f1; 2g. Note that a higher quality partners
equilibrium exists, since V = 0 (see Proposition 2).
The fact that zj is the combined quality threshold above which rmsimplement the joint project in a







Furthermore, the fact that zj corresponds to the lowest of such combined quality threshold levels when
the prior distribution of rm Bs quality is gjB implies, for all j 2 f1; 2g, that both the numerator and the
denominator of nj(z) are positive for all z 2 [0; zj ] (see the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix A.2.). We
continue the proof by focusing on the case: A = B = 1=2, gA(qA) = 1 for all qA 2 [0; 1], g1B(qB) = 1 for all
qB 2 [0; 1], and g2B(qB) = 2qB for all qB 2 [0; 1]. Note that rm Bs initial reputation under the prior g1B is 1=2.
This is smaller than rm Bs reputation under the prior g2B , which is 2=3. Moreover, using (4.2) we obtain in




32z3   48z2 + 9

if z  1=2 and r00A;z;1(f) = (3z + 1) =4 if z > 1=2; r00A;z;2(s) =
(64z5   20)=(120z4   35) if z  1=2 and r00A;z;2(s) = (4z + 16z2 + 8z3 + 2)=
 
10z + 15z2 + 5

if z > 1=2;
r00A;z;2(f) = (64z
5   80z4 + 10)=
 
120z4   160z3 + 25

if z  1=2 and r00A;z;2(f) =
 
14z + 8z2   2

= (15z + 5)
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A;z;1(s) for all z 2 [0; 1). This implies that
n2(z) > n1(z) for all z such that both the numerator and the denominator of n2(z) and n1(z) are positive.
Thus, n2(z) > n1(z) for all z 2 [0;minfz1 ; z2g]. This implies that z1 < z2 , since zj must satisfy nj(zj ) = zj ,
for all j 2 f1; 2g. This establishes the result in the Proposition. The case in which we focus here is a
special case of a more general result. In fact, it can be shown that if distributions g1B and g
2
B satisfy the
monotone likelihood ratio property in the sense that g2B(qB)=g
1
B(qB) is increasing in qB in the interval [0; 1],
r00A;z;2(f)  r00A;z;1(f) and r00A;z;2(s)  r00A;z;1(s) for all z 2 [0; 1), implying that z1  z2 when V = VB = 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose that an equilibrium where rms form a partnership regardless
of their qualities exists. In such an equilibrium, the decision to form a partnership is uninformative to
consumers about rmsqualities. This implies that r0i = ri, for all i 2 fA;Bg. Consider rst the case of rms
with qualities q = (0; 0) in this equilibrium. Firmsjoint prot if they form a partnership, which is equal to
(ArA +BrB)V + r
00
A(f)VA, must be greater than their joint prot if rm B implements the project alone,
which is equal to rBV + rAVA. Using the fact that A + B = 1, this condition is equivalent to
A[rA   rB ]V > VA[rA   r00A(f)]. (6.10)
From Lemma 1 and the fact that in this type of equilibrium interim beliefs in case a partnership is formed
are identical to initial beliefs, it follows that rA > r00A(f). This implies that the right-hand side of (6.10) is
(strictly) positive, which implies that
[rA   rB ]V > 0: (6.11)
Consider now the case of rms with qualities q = (1; 0) in the equilibrium under consideration here. LetbrA(') denote rm As reputation if rm A implements the joint project alone and the performance of the
joint project is ' 2 ff; sg. Firmsjoint prot if they form a partnership, which is equal to
[ArA + BrB ]V + fA[r00A(s)  r00A(f)] + r00A(f)gVA,
must be greater than their joint prot if rm A implements the project alone, which is equal to rAV +brA(s)VA.
This condition is equivalent to
(1  A)V [rB   rA] > VAfbrA(s)  r00A(f)  Ar00Ag, (6.12)
where r00A = r
00
A(s)   r00A(f). Since A < 1 and r00A > 0 (use Lemma 1 and the fact that in this type of
equilibrium H1(q) = G(q)), (6.12) implies that
(1  A)V [rB   rA]  VA[brA(s)  r00A(f) r00A],
which is equivalent to
(1  A)V [rB   rA]  VA[brA(s)  r00A(s)]. (6.13)
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By Lemma 1, brA(s)  r00A(s) = var(eqA) BrBrA(ArA + BrB) > 0,
where var(eqA) is the variance of eqA according to GA(q). Thus, the right-hand side of (6.13) is (strictly)
positive, which implies that
[rB   rA]V > 0 : (6.14)
Clearly, conditions (6.11) and (6.14) cannot hold simultaneously. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6. Consider a higher quality partners equilibrium. Firmsexpected joint prot
if they form a partnership and implement the joint project is given by




B ]V + f(AqA + BqB)[r00A(s)  r00A(f)] + r00A(f)gVA. (6.15)
Let A(q) denote rmsjoint prot if rm A implements the joint project alone and B(q) denote rms
joint prot if rm B does it. If qA < qA, by Lemma 2 the best alternative to a partnership is individual
implementation by rm B. Thus, rms form a partnership if and only if
P (q) > B(q). (6.16)
Since B(q) = rBV + rAVA and by denition in a higher quality partners equilibrium r00A(s) > r
00
A(f), we
obtain that (6.16) is equivalent to
AqA + BqB > z, (6.17)
where
z =
[rA   r00A(f)]VA + [rB   Ar0A   Br0B ]V
[r00A(s)  r00A(f)]VA
. (6.18)
Thus, rms form a partnership if their combined quality is above the threshold z. If qA > qA, the best
alternative to a partnership is individual implementation by rm A. Thus, rms form a partnership if and
only if
P (q) > A(q). (6.19)
Let brA(') denote rm As reputation if rm A implements the joint project alone and the performance of
the joint project is ' 2 ff; sg. Since A(q) = rAV + fqAbrA(s) + (1  qA)brA(f)gVA and in a higher quality
partners equilibrium r00A(s) > r
00
A(f), we obtain that (6.19) is equivalent to
qB    qA >  0; (6.20)
where
 0 =






[brA(s)  brA(f)]  A[r00A(s)  r00A(f)]
(1  A)[r00A(s)  r00A(f)]
. (6.22)
Moreover, from the fact that B(q) = A(q) when qA = qA and that P (q) is continuous in qA, it follows
that conditions (6.17) and (6.20) must be identical when qA = qA. This implies that  0 = z=(1   A)  
(A=(1   A) +  )qA. The result in the Proposition for qA > qA follows directly from the fact that  >
 A=B =  A=(1 A). To see that  >  A=(1 A), note that r00A(s) r00A(f) > 0 and that by applying
Lemma 1 when A = 1 we obtain brA(s)  brA(f) > 0. This completes the proof.
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